

## Message Text

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TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 225442

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, US, XJ (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SEPTEMBER 11 PRESS CON-  
FERENCE: AFRICAN EXCERPTS

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S SEPT. 11  
PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON (BEGIN TEXT):

"SECRETARY KISSINGER: BEFORE I TAKE QUESTIONS I WANTED  
TO MAKE A FEW POINTS ABOUT THE TRIP TO AFRICA THAT I AM  
UNDERTAKING, STARTING ON MONDAY:  
FIRST, THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC EFFORT IS BEING UNDERTAK-  
EN WITH THE SUPPORT AND WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF ALL  
OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED.  
SECONDLY, THERE IS NO "AMERICAN PLAN." THE SOLUTIONS  
HAVE TO BE FOUND IN AFRICA AND HAVE TO BE FOUND BY  
NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES.  
THIRD, THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED TO OFFER ITS GOOD  
OFFICES BECAUSE NO OTHER COUNTRY WAS AVAILABLE TO PERFORM  
THIS ROLE AND BECAUSE THE RISKS TO WORLD PEACE OF AN  
ESCALATING VIOLENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WERE VERY SEVERE.  
FOURTH, WAR HAD ALREADY STARTED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.  
THE DANGER OF ITS EXPANSION, THE DANGER OF FOREIGN INTER-  
VENTION, THE IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED  
STATES AND ON WORLD PEACE DICTATED THAT WE MAKE AN EFFORT  
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TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE WORST THAT CAN HAPPEN,  
IF THIS EFFORT FAILS, IS WHAT WAS CERTAIN TO HAPPEN IF  
THE EFFORT IS NOT MADE.

WE ARE DEALING WITH THREE PROBLEMS: NAMIBIA, RHODESIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA -- EACH HAVING DIFFERENT ASPECTS AND EACH HAVING DIFFERENT TIMETABLES.

ON THIS TRIP WE WILL DEAL PRIMARILY WITH THE ISSUES OF NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA. IT IS NOT A NEGOTIATION THAT WILL LEND ITSELF TO DRAMATIC FINAL CONCLUSIONS, BECAUSE THERE ARE, IN THE CASE OF RHODESIA, FOUR STATES, FOUR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, THE RHODESIAN SETTLERS IN SOUTH AFRICA INVOLVED; IN THE CASE OF NAMIBIA, SEVERAL AFRICAN STATES -- AGAIN SOUTH AFRICA -- THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT RECOGNIZED BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY NAMELY, SWAPO, AND SEVERAL INTERNAL GROUPS ASSEMBLED IN A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE.

WE ARE PURSUING THIS POLICY WHICH WILL NOT SUPPORT VIOLENCE AND WHICH STANDS OPPOSED TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION, IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ABOVE ALL FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA.

NOW I WILL BE GLAD TO TAKE QUESTIONS. YES, SIR.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU THINK ANY ARRANGEMENTS YOU CAN HELP TO MAKE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA CAN HAVE ANY LASTING RELEVANCE AND STABILITY IN A REGION WHERE THE STRONGEST NATION, SOUTH AFRICA, IS SAYING THROUGH PRIME MINISTER VORSTER THAT THEY INTEND TO PRESERVE THEIR SYSTEM OF WHITE RULE?

A. THE SOLUTIONS TO RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA, IF THEY CAN BE ACHIEVED, CAN HAVE A LASTING CHARACTER.

THE PURPOSE IS TO ENABLE A TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IN NAMIBIA AND TO MAJORITY RULE AND PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN RHODESIA UNDER CONDITIONS THAT WILL ENABLE ALL UNCLASSIFIED

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THE COMMUNITIES TO LIVE TOGETHER AND IN WHICH THE BLOOD-SHED IS PUT TO AN END.

THE CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA ARE MORE COMPLICATED AND REQUIRE A MUCH LONGER TIME SPAN FOR THEIR EVOLUTION.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU GO INTO SOME DETAIL ON THE APPARENT AMERICAN-BRITISH INCENTIVE PLAN TO HELP BRING

ABOUT A TRANSITION TO BLACK RULE IN RHODESIA?

THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF SPECULATION ABOUT IT. I KNOW YOU HAVE SPOKEN TO PEOPLE ON THE HILL ABOUT IT. COULD YOU PROVIDE US WITH SOME DETAILS?

A. OBVIOUSLY, ANY SOLUTION IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE TO HAVE POLITICAL COMPONENTS AND ECONOMIC COMPONENTS. IT SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN EFFORT TO BUY OUT THE WHITE SETTLERS.

RATHER, RHODESIA IS A RICH COUNTRY THAT CAN HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC RATE OF PROGRESS AFTER FULL INDEPENDENCE IS ACHIEVED.

WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND WITH OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES IS A SCHEME THAT CAN BE USED EITHER FOR INVESTMENT IN RHODESIA TO SPUR ECONOMIC PROGRESS, OR AS A SAFETY NET FOR THOSE SETTLERS WHO WANT TO LEAVE -- OR FOR BOTH.

SOME OF THE FUNDS CAN COME FROM PRIVATE SOURCES THAT HAVE ECONOMIC INTERESTS THERE. SOME CAN COME FROM GOVERNMENTS.

THE LEADERSHIP IN THIS EFFORT WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH HAS THE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RHODESIA, WITH OUR SUPPORT. WE HAVE TALKED TO OTHER COUNTRIES, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED ITS SUPPORT -- SO THIS PLAN IS GOING TO HAVE A WIDE BASIS, BUT ITS EXACT FEATURES CANNOT BE DISCUSSED UNTIL IT HAS EVOLVED FURTHER. BUT ITS BASIC PHILOSOPHY IS WHAT I HAVE OUTLINED HERE.

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Q. MR. SECRETARY, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK TWO QUESTIONS BASED ON YOUR STATEMENT:

YOU SAY THAT THIS IS NOT A NEGOTIATION WHICH LENDS ITSELF TO FINAL CONCLUSIONS; THEREFORE, WHAT WOULD YOU EXPECT TO ACHIEVE ON THIS, AND WHEN MIGHT YOU GET A FINAL CONCLUSION?

AND THEN YOU ALSO SAID THAT THE WORST THAT CAN HAPPEN IF THE EFFORT FAILS, IS THAT WHAT WAS CERTAIN TO HAPPEN, WILL HAPPEN, IF THE EFFORT WERE NOT MADE. WHAT IS THAT?

A. WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND QUESTION: WE ARE FACING A SITUATION NOW, IN WHICH A SO-CALLED "ARMED STRUGGLE" IS ALREADY TAKING PLACE IN RHODESIA AND IS BEGINNING IN NAMIBIA. THE HISTORY OF THESE STRUGGLES IS THAT THEY LEAD TO ESCALATING VIOLENCE, DRAWING IN MORE AND MORE COUNTRIES,

AND HAVE THE DANGER OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND THE PROBABILITY OF THE RADICALIZATION OF THE WHOLE CONTINENT OF AFRICA, IN WHICH MODERATE GOVERNMENTS WILL FIND IT LESS AND LESS POSSIBLE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE ASPIRATIONS OF THEIR PEOPLE, AND BECOMING MORE AND MORE FOCUSED ON EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

FOR THIS REASON, WE WANT TO PROVIDE A NON-VIOLENT ALTERNATIVE TO THIS PROSPECT.

NOW THIS PROSPECT IS BEFORE US. THIS PROSPECT HAS A SHORT TIME LIMIT, AND THEREFORE IT CANNOT WAIT FOR OUR OWN ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND THIS IS WHAT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAPPEN IF EFFORTS OF NEGOTIATION FAIL.

NOW I HAVE FORGOTTEN YOUR FIRST QUESTION.

Q. THE FIRST QUESTION WAS THAT IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU SAID: THIS IS NOT A NEGOTIATION THAT WILL LEND ITSELF TO DRAMATIC CONCLUSIONS --

SECRETARY: THAT'S RIGHT.

Q. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT TO ACHIEVE, AND WHEN MIGHT YOU UNCLASSIFIED

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EXPECT A FINAL CONCLUSION?

A. AS I POINTED OUT, WE ARE DEALING WITH ABOUT EIGHT PARTIES ON THE SIDE OF BLACK AFRICA. IN RHODESIA WE ARE DEALING WITH THE WHITE SETTLERS; AND WE ARE DEALING WITH SOUTH AFRICA. AND IN NAMIBIA ALSO WE ARE DEALING WITH MANY DIFFERENT GROUPS.

THEREFORE, IN BOTH CASES, AN OBJECTIVE IS TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH, THEN, THE DETAILS WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES CONCERNED. WE CANNOT SUPPLY THE DETAILS BY WHICH TRANSITIONS TO INDEPENDENCE ARE ACHIEVED. WHAT WE CAN DO IS TO BRING THE PARTIES SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE SO THAT THEY THINK A NEGOTIATING EFFORT -- THEY BELIEVE IN A NEGOTIATING EFFORT -- AND PERHAPS ESTABLISH SOME OF THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.

WHETHER THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED IN BOTH CASES IN ONE TRIP, I WOULD QUESTION; BUT PROGRESS TOWARD THESE OBJECTIVES CAN BE MADE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO END THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE THAT IS ALREADY TAKING PLACE ON RHODESIA'S

BORDERS, AND BEGINNING IN NAMIBIA? AND WILL YOU SEEK ANY COMMITMENTS FROM THE FRONT-LINE NATIONS TO DIMINISH THEIR SUPPORT OF THE GUERRILLA STRUGGLE -- IF YOU SUCCEED IN CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA?

A. I THINK EVERYBODY AGREES THAT IF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND, THAT THEN THERE IS NO PURPOSE IN A

GUERRILLA STRUGGLE. SO THE PROBLEM IS: CAN ONE FIND  
CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CAN AGREE TO THIS?

BUT AS I POINTED OUT, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SUPPORT  
VIOLENT SOLUTIONS WHEN PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVES ARE AVAILABLE.  
BERNIE?

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHY DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU, YOURSELF,  
SHOULD ENGAGE IN A SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY? WHY CANNOT THIS BE  
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DONE THROUGH MORE ORTHODOX DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS?

WHILE THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD SUPPORT ON THE HILL, ONE  
CONGRESSMAN YESTERDAY CHARACTERIZED THIS MISSION AS "LONE  
RANGER" DIPLOMACY, AND I WONDER IF YOU WOULD ADDRESS YOUR-  
SELF TO WHY YOU FEEL YOU, YOURSELF, MUST BE INVOLVED.

A. THAT CONGRESSMAN WAS NOT VERY ORIGINAL, IT SEEMS TO  
ME HE PLAGIARIZED A SOUTHERN GOVERNOR. (LAUGHTER)

WE HAVE HAD THREE MISSIONS IN AFRICA. THE BRITISH HAVE  
HAD TWO. AND A POINT HAS CLEARLY BEEN REACHED WHERE, SINCE  
THE PRESIDENTS OF SO MANY BLACK AFRICAN STATES ARE IN-  
VOLVED AS WELL AS THE LEADERS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA THAT  
MATTERS CANNOT BE BROUGHT BEYOND THIS POINT BY THE  
EXCHANGES OF NOTES, BY REFERRING DOCUMENTS BACK FOR  
DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS, AND THAT WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS AN  
IMPETUS IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CONDUCTED SOME-  
WHAT MORE FLEXIBLY.

THIS IS TRUE ESPECIALLY IN SOUTH AFRICA, AS WELL, WHERE  
SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS HAVE TO BE TAKEN.

SO THIS IS WHAT LED ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO BE-  
LIEVE THAT THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT YOU WILL BE SEE-  
ING SOME BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.

NOW YOU MENTIONED EARLIER THAT YOU DIDN'T EXPECT TO  
ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN QUESTION ON THIS  
PARTICULAR TRIP. WHAT WOULD BE THE PURPOSE OF YOUR MEET-

ING WITH BLACK AFRICANS WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA?

A. I EXPECT TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL COMMUNITIES  
IN SOUTH AFRICA, AND NOT ONLY OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY,  
PRIMARILY TO INFORM MYSELF ON CONDITIONS THERE, SO THAT  
I CAN FORM A BETTER JUDGMENT OF WHAT THE RIGHT AMERICAN  
POLICY MIGHT BE.

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Q. MR. SECRETARY; MANY AMERICANS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO U.S. INTEREST IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THAT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY IS NOT CONCERNED THERE. YOU, HOWEVER, HAVE A CONTRARY VIEW, AND I WONDER IF YOU CAN ELABORATE ON THAT A BIT MORE?

A. AS I POINTED OUT, AT ISSUE IS NOT ONLY THE FUTURE OF TWO STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT THE POTENTIAL EVOLUTION OF ALL OF AFRICA WITH ITS PROFOUND IMPACT ON EUROPE AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT IS THE FIXED AMERICAN POLICY THAT SOLUTIONS TO COMPLICATED INTERNATIONAL ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT BY VIOLENCE. AND CONVERSELY, IF THE PRINCIPLE OF VIOLENT SOLUTIONS IS ESTABLISHED, IT WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD.

SECONDLY, ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE INTERESTS THAT THEY HAVE IN A MODERATE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN AFRICA, AND THIS IS WHY WE HAVE RECEIVED PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN COOPERATING MOST CLOSELY; FROM THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE; AND FROM THE CHANCELLOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, TOGETHER WITH DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM ALL OUR OTHER ALLIES.

THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RADICALIZATION OF AFRICA WOULD BE SERIOUS IN MANY OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

WE ARE NOW AT A MOMENT WHEN WE CAN STILL, WITH RELATIVELY SMALL EFFORT, AT LEAST ATTEMPT TO ARREST THIS.

WE HAVE BEEN URGED, NOT ONLY BY THE STATES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA BUT BY ALL THE MODERATE LEADERS IN AFRICA, TO ENGAGE IN THIS ENTERPRISE, BECAUSE THEY UNDERSTAND WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRIES. AND THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IS INVOLVED.

SUCCESS IS NOT GUARANTEED, BUT AN EFFORT MUST BE MADE.

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Q. MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU EXPECT THE CURRENT SITUATION TO RESULT POSSIBLY IN ANY FURTHER CURRENCY DEVALUATION SUCH AS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAND AND THE BRITISH POUND?

A. I DON'T THINK I SHOULD BE ASKED ECONOMIC QUESTIONS,

SINCE THERE ARE SO MANY PEOPLE HERE WHO WILL TELL YOU THAT I AM AN ARGUMENT AGAINST UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE ON THESE ISSUES.

I HAVE NOT EVEN THOUGHT ABOUT THIS. I DON'T EXPECT THAT IT WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT ON DEVALUATION.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT ROLE DO YOU THINK THE WEST GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC CAN PLAY BEING HELPFUL IN THIS AFRICAN SETTLEMENT?

A. AS CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT SAID AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN HAMBURG, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC HAS A HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP TO SOME OF THE POPULATION IN NAMIBIA. I UNDERSTAND THERE ARE ABOUT 30,000 PEOPLE OF GERMAN ORIGIN THAT LIVE IN NAMIBIA, AND SO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC CAN BE HELPFUL, ESPECIALLY HELPFUL IN ANY EFFORTS THAT MAY BE MADE THERE, BUT IT HAS INDICATED THAT IT WILL GIVE ITS GENERAL SUPPORT TO EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA GENERALLY.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IF THIS MATTER IS SO IMPORTANT TO UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY, WHY WASN'T A GREAT DEAL MORE DONE LONG AGO WHEN THE POSITIONS WERE NOT SO FIXED, AND WHEN IT WAS MORE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE AREA?

A. BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS FOR MAKING PROGRESS DID NOT EXIST PREVIOUSLY. UNTIL THE COLLAPSE OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIAL EMPIRE, THE CONDITIONS DID NOT EXIST.

SECONDLY, THE UNITED STATES DID NOT FEEL THAT IT HAD A PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IN AN AREA THAT HAD BEEN TRADITIONALLY GOVERNED BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND WHERE MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD A LONGER HISTORICAL INTEREST, AND THEREFORE WE WANTED TO GIVE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO GREAT BRITAIN, WHICH WAS ENGAGED IN A DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH RESPECT TO RHODESIA, FOR THIS EFFORT TO SUCCEED.  
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IT WAS THE COMBINATION OF A NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH MADE IT CLEAR THAT THESE METHODS WOULD NOT WORK AND THAT UNDERLINED THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT BLACK RHODESIAN UNITY IS POSSIBLE, AND WILL YOU MEET WITH ANY

BLACK RHODESIANS ON THIS TRIP?

A. THE MEETING IN DAR, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO -- WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER THE SO-CALLED FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS, AND THE VARIOUS LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, WAS MORE SUCCESSFUL IN BRINGING ABOUT UNITY AMONG THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS THAN AMONG LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. I WOULD

SAY THAT AT THIS MOMENT THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF  
UNITY AMONG THESE MOVEMENTS.

WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER I SHOULD MEET THEM OR NOT, I WILL  
BE GUIDED BY THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS.

I HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID FOREIGN  
INTERVENTION ON THE MODEL OF ANGOLA, THAT THE UNITED  
STATES WOULD NOT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE LIBERATION MOVE-  
MENTS, PROVIDED NO OTHER COUNTRY WOULD DO THIS.

IF ANY OF THE PRESIDENTS THINK-- OR IF THE PRESIDENTS  
THINK THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR ME TO MEET WITH THEM,  
THEN I WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO IT.

BUT I MUST STRESS THAT THE SOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS IS  
PRIMARILY AN AFRICAN MATTER AND OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED.  
THE UNITED STATES CAN ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY. THE UNITED  
STATES CAN OFFER SUGGESTIONS. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT  
BRING ABOUT UNITY. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BY ITSELF  
BRING ABOUT MODERATION, AND THE FINAL OUTCOME DEPENDS  
ON THE WISDOM AND THE CAPACITY TO WORK TOGETHER OF THE  
AFRICAN PARTIES.

Q. HOW CRITICAL IS UNITY AMONG THE LIBERATION GROUPS TO  
YOUR CURRENT EFFORT?  
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A. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO DETERMINE HOW A SOLUTION IS TO BE  
ACHIEVED. IF THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS AND THE VARIOUS LIBER-  
ATION MOVEMENTS FEEL THAT THEY CAN NEGOTIATE BY HAVING  
INDIVIDUAL TEAMS, THEN IT IS NOT FOR ME TO DECIDE THAT  
THEY SHOULD USE ANOTHER METHOD.

SO I WOULD SAY THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
ON THE BLACK AFRICAN SIDE DEPENDS ON THE AFRICAN PRESI-  
DENTS, AND IT IS NOT GOING TO BE PRESCRIBED BY THE  
UNITED STATES.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DOES PRESIDENT FORD FEEL THAT THERE IS  
ANY POLITICAL GAIN IN YOUR EMBARKING ON THIS DIPLOMATIC  
SHUTTLE? AND, SECONDLY, YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE COM-

PLEXITY OF THIS ISSUE. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO COM-  
PLETE THE BEGINNINGS OF SUCCESS IN THIS ISSUE,  
ASSUMING YOU MAKE PROGRESS, PRIOR TO THE ELECTION, OR IN  
THE PERIOD PRIOR TO INAUGURATION? AREN'T YOU AGAINST  
SOME SORT OF POLITICAL DEADLINE?

A. I THINK FIRST OF ALL, WITH RESPECT TO POLITICAL BENE-  
FITS, IT WAS ACCEPTED WISDOM THAT THE TRIP TO AFRICA IN  
APRIL WAS NOT A SPECTACULAR SUCCESS IN MANY OF THE PRI-



MARY ELECTIONS THAT WERE THEN TAKING PLACE.

IT WAS UNDERTAKEN, AND IT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE TIME, BECAUSE HE CONCLUDED THAT WE COULD NOT, IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DELAY ANY LONGER.

WHETHER PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE BEFORE THE ELECTION, I CANNOT SAY. BUT THAT PROGRESS NEEDS TO BE MADE DURING THIS YEAR IF THE SITUATION IS NOT TO GET DANGEROUSLY OUT OF CONTROL ON AT LEAST SOME OF THE ISSUES, I BELIEVE ALL THE STUDENTS OF THE SUBJECT AGREE TO.

THE IMPACT OF THIS NEGOTIATION ON THE ELECTION IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE. IT SHOULD HAVE NO IMPACT WHATSOEVER. I WAS ON THE HILL YESTERDAY MEETING WITH 47 UNCLASSIFIED

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SENATORS, AND I FOUND THAT THERE WAS AN ESSENTIALLY NON-PARTISAN SUPPORT.

WHAT WE ARE DOING IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN AFRICA IS NOT A PARTY MATTER. IT IS A MATTER FOR ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND IT WILL NOT BE HANDLED AS A PARTY ISSUE, AND I BELIEVE IT WILL NOT BE HANDLED AS A PARTISAN ISSUE BY EITHER SIDE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT A FRAMEWORK OF NEGOTIATIONS, DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU NEED A COMMITMENT FROM RHODESIA TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE BLACK MAJORITY WITHIN TWO YEARS, AND CAN YOU GET THAT ON THIS TRIP? CAN YOU GET IT WITHOUT HAVING SOMEONE TO WHOM TO TRANSFER POWER?

A. I DO NOT WANT TO PREDICT WHAT IS POSSIBLE WITHIN ANY PARTICULAR TIME-FRAME.

WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO ON THIS TRIP IS TO MOVE MATTERS FORWARD TOWARDS THE POINT WHERE NEGOTIATIONS CAN START, AND WHERE SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS MAY EMERGE.

I WOULD NOT EXPECT THAT THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH RESPECT TO RHODESIA ON ONE TRIP.

WITH RESPECT TO NAMIBIA, THE ISSUE IS WHETHER A FRAMEWORK OF PARTICIPANTS IN POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS CAN EMERGE. I AM SOMEWHAT MORE HOPEFUL ON THIS. BUT EVEN THAT ISSUE INVOLVING SO MANY PARTIES, I WOULD NOT WANT TO PREDICT UNTIL I HAD TALKED TO THEM.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, TO FOLLOW UP DON OBERDORFER'S QUESTION, IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED NOT ONLY THAT U.S. POLICY BEFORE LAST APRIL WAS INDIFFERENT TO AFRICA, BUT THAT IT ACTIVELY

AIDED THE WHITE MINORITY REGIMES. PARTICULARLY AS A  
TOKEN OF THIS IS THE BYRD AMENDMENT.

LAST APRIL YOU PROMISED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD  
TAKE STEPS TO REPEAL THAT AMENDMENT. THAT WAS ALMOST  
FIVE MONTHS AGO. NO STEPS HAVE BEEN MADE.

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ARE YOU GOING TO BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN THIS TO THE AFRICAN  
HEADS OF STATE?

A. I BELIEVE THAT THE AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE UNDER-  
STAND THAT IF A NEGOTIATION CAN BE ARRANGED OVER  
RHODESIA, THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS WILL THEN BE SUBSTANTIALLY  
IRRELEVANT. THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS ARISES ONLY UNDER  
CONDITIONS WHEN THERE IS NO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS  
AND NO PROSPECT FOR A TRANSITION IN THE GOVERNMENTAL  
STRUCTURE.

THEREFORE, I HAVE FOUND THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL  
UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE BLACK AFRICAN PRESIDENTS  
FOR THE STEPS WE HAVE BEEN TAKING.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU'RE AN OLD HAND AT BEING A TROUBLE-  
SHOOTER IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD. I'M WONDERING NOW,  
AS YOU 'RE ABOUT TO LEAVE, HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR OWN  
CHANCES OF SUCCEEDING?

A. I WAS AFRAID YOU MEANT AS I'M ABOUT TO LEAVE OFFICE  
AND I THOUGHT 1981 WASN'T THAT IMMINENT. (LAUGHTER)

THIS IS THE MOST COMPLEX NEGOTIATION PROCEDURALLY IN  
WHICH I'VE BEEN ENGAGED, AND THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS ARE  
VERY DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE, BECAUSE IT DEPENDS ON SO MANY  
INTANGIBLES AND BECAUSE THERE ISN'T ANY ONE INTERLOCUTOR  
ON EACH SIDE.

SENATOR CLARK ESTIMATED MY CHANCES AT SUCCESS AT 1 IN 20.  
I RATE MY CHANCES HIGHER THAN THAT, BUT I DON'T WANT TO  
GIVE AN EXACT PERCENTAGE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, TWICE THIS MORNING YOU'VE MENTIONED  
THAT YOUR MISSION HAS THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE PARTIES CON-  
CERNED IN THE AREA. BY SAYING THAT, DO YOU MEAN THE  
BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENTS? DO YOU HAVE ANY WORD FROM  
THEM THAT THEY WELCOME THE MISSION WHICH YOU ARE ABOUT TO  
UNDERTAKE?

A. I HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAVE NOT DEALT DIRECTLY WITH  
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THE BLACK LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. SO, WHEN I SPEAK OF THE PARTIES I SPEAK OF THE STATES IN THE AREA, AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO THIS PROCESS IS BEING WORKED OUT BY THE SO-CALLED FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS. WE HAVE NOT HAD ANY DIRECT DISCUSSION WITH THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

Q. IF I CAN FOLLOW THAT UP, YOU SAID, AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, THAT YOU WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THEM --

SECRETARY: EXCUSE ME. WE'VE HAD A DISCUSSION WITH SWAPO WITH RESPECT TO NAMIBIA, AND I WOULD APPLY MY STATEMENT TO THEM.

Q. WELL, THAT PERHAPS IS THE POINT I WAS MAKING. SOME OF THESE MOVEMENTS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, HAVE HAD RELATIONS OR HAVE HAD CONTACTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE PAST. WHERE YOU SAID YOU WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THEM AS LONG AS OTHER GOVERNMENTS DID NOT, I WONDERED HOW YOU TOOK THAT INTO ACCOUNT.

A. WELL, CLEARLY, IF OUTSIDE POWERS BECOME VERY ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THEN THE DANGER OF AFRICA BECOMING AN ARENA FOR SUPERPOWER CONFLICT IS VERY GREAT, AND I HAVE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES STANDS OPPOSED TO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS.

UP TO NOW WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IN THE LAST MONTHS THE RHODESIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS HAVE DEALT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD SUBSTANTIALLY THROUGH THE VARIOUS FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS, WHICH IS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT I HAVE OF THE SITUATION. SHOULD THAT CHANGE, THEN THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO REEXAMINE ITS POSITION.

Q. MR. SECREARY, BACK TO RHODESIA AGAIN ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS, WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE ON THE HILL TO THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PLAN? AND COULD YOU BE CLEARER-- IS IT A CASE OF THE UNITED STATES BEING ASKED TO SPEND SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS IN ALLOCATIONS, OR IS IT A KIND OF POSSIBILITY, IS IT AN INSURANCE PLAN?

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A. WE ARE TALKING PRIMARILY OF AN INSURANCE PLAN -- NOR ARE WE SAYING THAT THE AMERICAN PART OF THIS INSURANCE PLAN HAS TO COME ENTIRELY FROM GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES. THERE ARE OTHER SOURCES THAT MAY ALSO BE AVAILABLE.

SO WE HAVE NOT WORKED OUT A FIGURE; WE HAVE NOT YET WORKED OUT A GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION. BUT WE ARE TALKING OF

SOMETHING THAT IS ESSENTIALLY AN INSURANCE PLAN RATHER THAN A DIRECT COMMITMENT, AND WE'RE TALKING OF A CONSORTIUM IN WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM WILL BE THE CONVOKING COUNTRY WITH OUR SUPPORT AND WHICH WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT, WE EXPECT, OF MOST INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU ANTICIPATE BEING ABLE TO PRESENT THIS PACKAGE TO PRIME MINISTER SMITH DURING THIS TRIP?

A. I HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER I WILL MEET WITH PRIME

MINISTER SMITH ON THIS TRIP. THIS DEPENDS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS AND ON OUR ESTIMATE OF HIS BASIC ATTITUDE. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 16 SEP 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, GOVERNMENT REFORM, PRESS CONFERENCES, MINISTERIAL VISITS  
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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
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**Disposition Comment:**  
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**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** vandyklc  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 29 JUL 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <29 JUL 2004 by schaeafaj>; APPROVED <18 AUG 2004 by vandyklc>  
**Review Markings:**

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**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
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**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006